Catchment areas and access to better schools by Calsamiglia, Caterina et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series  
Working Paper nº 631 
 
Catchment Areas and Access to Better 
Schools 
Caterina Calsamiglia 
Antonio Miralles 
 
This version: December 2014 
May 2012 
Catchment Areas and
Access to Better Schools
Caterina Calsamiglia and Antonio Miralles∗
December 23, 2014
Abstract
We compare popular school choice mechanisms in terms of children’s access to
better schools (ABS) than their catchment area school, in districts with school strati-
fication and where priority is given for residence in the catchment area of the school.
In a large market model with two good schools and one bad school, we calculate
worst-case and best-case bounds of the Boston Mechanism (BM). We find that both
BM and DA convey a non-negligible risk that catchment area priority fully deter-
mines the final assignment regardless parents’ preferences. Top-Trading Cycles is an
alternative that provides more access to better schools than DA.
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1 Introduction
The importance of allowing for school choice has been greatly emphasized in the literature
and in the policy debate. In the past, children were systematically assigned to their
neighborhood school. School choice, then, referred to residential choice or Tiebout choice–
see Hoxby(2003), Black (1999), Cullen, Jacob and Levitt (2006). A large fraction of OECD
countries has expanded choice in various ways in the last two decades. As described in
the Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice’s website: “School Choice is a common
sense idea that gives parents the power and freedom to choose their child’s education [. . . ]
School Choice is a public policy that allows parents/guardians to choose a school regardless
of residence and location”. Hence, school choice aims to improve Access to Better Schools
(ABS) for families beyond their neighborhood school.
The main problem when introducing school choice is resolving excess demands for
certain schools and defining the alternatives for applicants rejected from those schools. In
most cases local authorities define priority rules that determine how applicants shall be
prioritized in case of overdemand. Priority is often given to families that have a sibling in
the school, that live in the school’s catchment area or that have particular socioeconomic
circumstances. The norms describing how applicants rejected from their first choice are
reallocated define the different mechanisms that the market design literature on school
choice, starting with Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003), has analyzed extensively.
In this paper we study the most common mechanisms, the Gale Shapley Deferred
Acceptance (DA), the Boston mechanism (BM), and the Top Trading Cycles (TTC), with
coarse priorities defined by residence in the neighborhood of the school to break ties for
overdemanded schools.1 We introduce vertical differentiation between schools: there is a
bad school, a school that all families believe is the worst. We study the extent to which
families can move away from their neighborhood school, the school they are given priority
for by the authorities (the default school when there is no school choice). For this purpose
we define Access to Better School (ABS), which is the expected fraction of individuals who
are allocated a school that is better than their neighborhood school.
We show that priorities may limit ABS drastically, both under DA and BM. But the
instances under which DA and BM do worst in terms of ABS differ. BM does worst when
the bad school is (cardinally) substantially worse than the other schools, forcing families
to apply for their neighborhood school to avoid the bad school. But when the bad school is
not (cardinally) too different, then truthful revelation can be optimal, leading to maximal
ABS. Instead, under DA the cardinality of the bad school plays no role, but the number of
children living in the good neighborhood as compared to capacity in the school does. On
one extreme, when both good schools are overprioritized (i.e. they have no less students
living in the neighborhood than capacity), all students will, at best, be allocated to their
neighborhood school, independently of their preferences. To understand why DA fails in
1In some cities only a fraction of the seats are reserved for prioritized students. The seats for which
no priorities apply, overdemands are resolved randomly and so our results will be relaxed. We discuss this
case in the discussion at the end of the paper.
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this case, consider the simple example where all schools have equal capacity and equal
mass of prioritized students, that is 1/3. Clearly, no student in the catchment area of a
good school can end up in the bad school under DA (access to neighborhood school is
guaranteed). In other words, all student living in the catchment area of the bad school are
condemned to stay there, regardless of their lottery number. Students with priority in the
different good schools may want to “exchange” their slots. Nevertheless, when applying
for their preferred school, since they do not have priority for it, they will have to get a
higher lottery number than any of the individuals living in the bad neighborhood. In a
big economy, the individual with highest lottery number in the bad neighborhood would
systematically win, blocking ABS for individuals in the good neighborhoods. Only when
the bad school is more prioritized than both good schools (i.e. it has a larger students
living in the neighborhood-capacity ratio), will there be increased ABS. Students with the
best lottery numbers from the bad neighborhood obtain access to a good school, and this
in turn allows for an increased exchange of slots. However, DA never reaches the upper
bound in ABS that BM does. This result is true for any stable mechanism, a property that
has been greatly emphasized in the literature– see Roth (2008). Importantly, the result in
BM stems from risk avoidance and not from stability.2
On the other hand TTC can be proven to dominate DA in terms of ABS. In TTC
individuals preferring each others’ schools can always trade (this is precisely how the mech-
anism operates), and so a minimum level of ABS, always higher than that under DA, is
guaranteed. As will become clear TTC does not always dominate BM.
Empirical evidence on the performance of these mechanisms is scarce. The main chal-
lenge is that preferences are unobservable. When DA or TTC are implemented strat-
egyproofness facilitates inferring preferences, but under the BM preferences need to be
estimated.3 He (2014) uses data from Beijing to perform such exercise, but his framework
is not useful for our purpose since there are no residential priorities. Calsamiglia and Gu¨ell
(2014) show that priorities play a large role in determining the list submitted by par-
ents under the BM. They exploit a change in the definition of neighborhoods in the city of
Barcelona to identify that a large fraction of parents apply for the neighborhood school, in-
dependently of their preferences. Calsamiglia, Fu and Gu¨ell (2014) model and structurally
estimate the preferences of individuals in Barcelona and do counterfactual analysis of the
allocation that would result if DA or TTC were implemented instead. Table 18 in their
paper shows the results from their simulations for specific subgroups of the population.
We are particularly interested in the last line which presents the assignment for families
who’s favorite school is not their neighborhood school. As we can see both BM and DA
assign them to their neighborhood school more often then TTC. For DA, despite the fact
2Recall that the set of NE assignments in BM necessarily coincides with the set of stable assignments
only if priorities are strict.
3Dur, Kominers, Pathak and So¨nmez (2014) analyze data from the city of Boston, where the DA is
used with neighborhood priorities, but only for half of the seats in each school. There, all schools fill their
prioritized seats with neighborhood students except for the worst three schools. This is obviously no proof
of our theory, but provides some indication that our results may be relevant.
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that families can be truthful and reveal that they want to move out of their neighborhood,
the mechanism assigns them more often to the neighborhood school, more than BM does.
This is so despite the fact that incentives under BM induce a substantial fraction of fam-
ilies to exclude their preferred school and apply to neighborhood. On the other hand we
also see that TTC clearly facilitates families moving out of their neighborhood, more than
DA and BM. In the particular case of Barcelona, then, the loss due to overassignment to
neighborhood school induced by both DA and BM limits the power of families’ preferences
to determine the allocation of students to schools.
The Cost of the Elimination of Justified Envy (Calsamiglia, Fu and Gu¨ell (2014))
Assigned in Zone (%) Assigned to Favorite (%)
BM DA TTC BM DA TTC
All Households 65.5 69.7 58.5 79.4 75.0 80.7
Favorite is in Zone 95.3 95.4 89.9 92.6 89.8 83.8
Favorite is out of Zone 19.5 30.0 10.0 58.9 52.0 76.0
The mechanism design literature on school choice, starting with Abdulkadirog˘lu and
So¨nmez (2003), has studied the problem of allocating students to a set of schools. This
constitutes what the literature refers to as a two sided matching problem, but with the
special feature that schools, in this case composing one of the two sides of the market, can-
not express their preferences over students. School preferences are substituted by priority
orders determined by the central administration according to residence and other socioeco-
nomic characteristics of the family. These centralized processes involve families submitting
a list with a ranking of schools and a set of rules defining how these preferences, together
with priorities, determine the final allocation. These priorities have been taken as given by
the school choice literature and they are viewed as a constraint that the mechanism should
respect. The focus has been on designing norms that provide parents with incentives to
submit preferences to allocate children most effectively, but taking priorities as given.
The literature has emphasized different properties of the norms characterizing the mech-
anism: strategy-proofness, stability and efficiency. The first property consists of providing
incentives to reveal true preferences independently of what other families do, referred to
as the mechanism being strategy proof. The Boston mechanism (BM), one of the most
widely used but also criticized mechanisms, described later in the text, lacks this prop-
erty. This implies that families can get a better allocation by stating a different ranking
from that defined by their true preferences. Alternative mechanisms, such as the Gale-
Shapley Deferred Acceptance algorithm (DA), also described later, do have this property
and therefore elicit true preferences. This greatly simplifies matters for families. DA is
also valued because its resulting allocation is stable. Stability requires the final allocation
to be such that we cannot simultaneously have 1) an individual who prefers a given school
to her assigned school, and 2) the preferred school has another individual admitted with
lower priority than she has for that school. Importantly, the results on DA in this paper
apply to any stable mechanism. But the DA allocation is not Pareto efficient except for
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some specific priority structures (Ergin, 2002). Pareto-efficiency is defined as the lack of
an alternative allocation that makes an individual better off without making another in-
dividual worse off. The Top Trading Cycles (TTC), also described in the next section, is
strategy proof and efficient, but is not stable. There is no mechanism that has the three
properties. But the efficiency costs of DA, as measured in experiments, such as Chen and
So¨nmez (2006), are small and so DA has actually been adopted in cities like New York
and Boston, substituting the former mechanism, referred to as the Boston Mechanism.4
Both DA and Boston, or a combination of the two (see Chen and Kesten (2013)) are the
most debated alternatives (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003); Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak,
Roth and So¨nmez (2006); Ergin and So¨nmez (2006); Miralles (2008); Pathak and So¨nmez
(2008); Abdulkadirog˘lu, Che and Yasuda (2011)). TTC was only used in New Orleans for
the year 2012.
This paper suggests that, unless certain priorities are questioned, the choice between
these two main mechanisms may be less important, given that in both cases the final al-
location of students is largely determined by priority rules. Similarly to Miralles (2008),
Abdulkadirog˘lu, Che and Yasuda (2011), we follow Auman (1964) and assume that there is
a continuum of individuals to be allocated to a finite number of seats in schools. Neverthe-
less, we include a preliminary section containing a leading example with a finite number of
students. There it can be seen that our insights hold even for relatively small assignment
problems.
Our base model contains a binomial priority structure (families either have priority or
not) that we intuitively connect to residential priorities (or walking-zone priorities).5 This
kind of reasonable coarse priority structures lie in between two rather extreme models in
the theoretical literature: the strict priority model (e.g. Ergin and So¨nmez, 2006; Pathak
and So¨nmez, 2008) and the no-priorities model (Abdulkadirog˘lu, Che and Yasuda, 2011;
Miralles, 2008).6 In our model all seats follow the same priority structure. In cities like
Boston or New Orleans only a fraction of the seats are prioritized. For the remaining
seats, overdemands are resolved randomly. We do not consider these non-prioritizes seats
explicitly in our model, but clearly the larger the fraction of non-prioritized seats, the less
relevant are our results.7 The objective in this paper is to illustrate that priorities create
problems that the literature had not emphasized enough. Hence, for ease of exposition we
focus on the case where all seats are prioritized.
The key additional element in our model is the existence of some degree of vertical
4Experiments evaluating the efficiency cost have been done in the lab, and the simulated environments
used did not contain bad schools, as we model them here or are found in the data. This paper suggests
that under the presence of bad schools efficiency losses may be very large, since preferences may have a
rather small effect on the final allocation.
5Extensions including sibling priorities and low-income / bad-neighborhood priorities can easily be
included and are available upon request.
6All these papers discuss their models beyond the adopted extreme assumption, yet their most illustra-
tive proofs rely on them. See Ergin and Erdil (2008) for an exception that formally analyzes weak priority
structures.
7We explicitly discuss the the case with a fraction of prioritized seats at the end of the paper.
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differentiation across schools, so that there is at least one bad school that is homogeneously
thought to be the worst. We argue that this is an element that we typically find in school
choice realities. In most cities where school choice is implemented there is a set of so-called
failing schools, schools that are explicitly considered bad by local authorities. In the US
the requirement of the federal No Child Left Behind Public Choice Program requires that
local school districts allow students in academically unacceptable schools (F-rated schools)
to transfer to higher performing, non-failing schools in the district– if there is capacity
available.8
This paper emphasizes that the two most debated and used mechanisms in the litera-
ture and in the policy debate may both be very limited in their capacity to allocate children
according to their preferences whenever there are coarse priorities to break ties that impose
a different ordering across different schools. Priorities limit the extent to which families’
preferences determine the final allocation. The mechanism design literature should incor-
porate the design of the priority structure explicitly, since it may deem crucial for the
properties of the final allocation.
The results of this paper are also important for the empirical literature in the economics
of education that evaluates the impact of school choice on school outcomes– see Lavy
(2010), Hastings, Kane and Staiger (2010). This literature assumes that implementing
choice implies that preferences will affect the allocation of children to schools. But these
empirical papers ignore how allocation mechanisms are affected by the priority structure
and therefore they may be attributing the effects to the wrong source of variation.
The results in this paper are presented in a rather stylized model for ease of exposition.
The model should facilitate understanding the intuition for the results without harming
its perceived robustness. Next we present the mechanisms and an example that illustrates
the main intuitions underlying our general results . Section 4 presents the main results,
evaluating the performance of the different mechanisms. Section 5 provides some discussion
and section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains a discussion of the discrete model and
Appendix B contains all proofs.
2 The Mechanisms
The mechanisms we compare are the Deferred Acceptance (DA), the Boston Mechanism
(BM) and the Top-Trading Cycles (TTC). In all these mechanisms, parents (students) are
requested to submit a ranked list of schools. The student’s strategy space is the set of all
rankings among the schools. Each student may belong to the catchment area of a school.
Belonging to a school’s catchment area is the main priority criterion when resolving excess
demands. Additionally, a unique lottery number per agent breaks any other eventual tie.
The outcome of the lottery is uncertain at the moment students submit their lists.
8See Title I Public School Choice for schools identified as Low Performing:
http://www.ncpie.org/nclbaction/publicchoice.html.
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Deferred Acceptance (DA):
• In every round, each student applies for the highest school in its submitted list that
has not rejected her yet.
• For every round k, k ≥ 1: Each school tentatively assigns seats to the students that
apply to it or that were preaccepted in the previous round following its priority order
(breaking ties through a fair lottery)9. When the school capacity is attained the
school rejects any remaining students that apply to it in that round.
• The DA mechanism terminates when no student is rejected. The tentative matching
becomes final.10
Boston Mechanism (BM):
• In every round, each students applies for the highest school in its submitted list that
has not rejected her yet.
• For every round k, k ≥ 1: Each school assigns its remaining seats to the students
that apply to it following its priority order, and breaking ties through a random
lottery when necessary. If the school capacity is or was attained, the school rejects
any remaining students that point to it.
• The Boston mechanism algorithm terminates when all students have been assigned
to a school, in at most three rounds.
Top-Trading Cycles (TTC):
• In each round, we find a cycle as follows. Taking a school s, we choose its first
student in the priority list, i. This student points at her most preferred school s′,
which points at its highest-priority student i′, etc. A cycle is always found because
there is a finite number of schools.
• We assign to each student of the cycle a slot of the school she points at. We remove
these students and slots.
• We repeat the process round by round (having erased completely filled schools from
students’ lists and assigned students from schools’ priority lists) until we have as-
signed all the students.
9We assume that there is a single tie-breaker that serves to break ties when necessary at all schools. We
justify this assumption on Abdulkadirog˘lu, Che and Yasuda (2014), which shows that a multiple tie-breaker
(one for each school) in DA would lead to Pareto inefficient assignments.
10Abdulkadirog˘lu, Che and Yasuda (2014) show that this algorithm converges to an assignment in big
continuum economies, even though not necessarily in finite time.
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3 A Finite Economy Example
Our main model uses a continuum economy for ease of exposition. In this section we illus-
trate the main insights of the paper through an example with a finite set of individuals. We
have three neighborhoods with n families living in each of them, and each with a school of
capacity n. Let i ∈ {i1, i2, i3} denote that the individual lives in the neighborhood of school
s ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and therefore has priority at school s. Ties in priorities given by residence are
broken through a unique fair lottery. Individual preferences can be representen through
the following von Neumann - Morgenstern valuations for schools, where v ∈ (0, 1):
type\school 1 2 3
i1 v 1 0
i2 1 v 0
i3 1 v 0
Note that we have constructed an example where potential for choice benefiting stu-
dents is maximal. That is, we have assumed all students would rather be assigned to a
different school than their neighborhood school. Any Pareto Efficient Allocation in this
example involves having no pair of students in school 1 and 2 be assigned to their own
neighborhood school, since they would be better off by trading their seats (individuals
living in neighborhood 1 prefer attending s2 and viceversa).
In Deferred Acceptance, students with priority at a good school have guaranteed as-
signment to a good school. This implies that all students of the i3 type are eventually
assigned to the worst school. Students i1 and i2 would like to “exchange” their guaran-
teed slots. But through the DA, since they do not have priority for their preferred school,
this “exchange” will only happen if two individuals, an i1 and an i2, get a better lottery
number than the i3−student with the highest lottery number. The student i3 with the
highest lottery number can block each trade with a probability higher or equal to 2/3.
The probability of blocking the x-th exchange rapidly increases with x, since not doing
so requires both x-th best lottery numbers in i1 and i2 to beat the best lottery number
in i3. In the Appendix we provide the exact method of calculation of the chances to ob-
tain exactly x = 1, .., n exchanges. Thus, Table 1 presents the results from calculate the
expected proportion of students that obtain access to a better school than the catchment
area school. This percentage rapidly decreases to zero as n grows large. Even with n being
small, the percentage is dramatically low (1.77% with twenty students per school).
This trade-blocking cannot happen under TTC. School 1 points at a student with type
i1, who points at school 2, which points at a student with type i2, who points at school 1,
and the cycle is closed. Students from types i1 and i2 are assigned to a school that is better
than their priority-giving schools regardless of how lucky students of type i3 are with their
lottery numbers.
As for BM, we distinguish two different cases. In case 1, where v = 0.9, the bad school
is much worse than the second-best school for every student. The unique Nash equilibrium
(in undominated strategies) involves students of types i1 and i2 ranking their respective
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neighborhood school first, and each student is assigned his neighborhood school. Hence
ABS in this case is equal to 0.
In case 2, where v = 0.1 the bad school is similar to the second-best school for every
student. Even though the former Nash equilibrium still exists, another Nash equilibrium
(in undominated strategies) exists in which all students submit a truthful ranking over
schools. For any n, all students of type i1 obtain a slot at school 2, while students of types
i2 and i3 have fifty per cent chances of obtaining a slot at school 1, and fifty per cent to
obtain a slot at the worst school. In case 2 then, an equilibrium exists in which all the
slots at good schools are given to students who prefer these more than their priority-giving
schools. Hence, in this case ABS is maximal and equal to 67%.
Table 1 summarizes the expected number of students who obtain a better placement
than the school for which they had priority (weighted by the size 3n of the market).
Table 1: Expected percentage of students who get Access to Better School (ABS)
Mechanism \ n 1 2 5 10 20 ∞
BM (v = 0.9) 0 0 0 0 0 0
DA 22 13.3 6.3 3.4 1.77 0
BM (v = 0.1) 66.7 66.7 66.7 66.7 66.7 66.7
TTC 66.7 66.7 66.7 66.7 66.7 66.7
BM (case 1) obtains the worst performance possible in terms of access to a better school.
The assignment is fully determined by the priority structure. BM (case 1) performs worse
than DA, although insignificantly so as n goes large. In fact both perform extremely
bad. Notice how the expected percentage of students who improve upon their catchment
areas rapidly decreases to zero under DA. With ten students per school, only 3.4% of
them are expected to obtain a better assignment outside their catchment areas. With
twenty students per school, this percentage is 1.77%. This exemplifies that the bad results
obtained by DA later in the model are not an artifact of the continuum.
In contrast, BM (case 2), which performs as good as TTC, obtain maximum access to
better schools for any n. The comparison between DA and BM crucially depends on the
intensity of students’ preferences between the second-best school and the worst school. In
case 1, preferences lead to a (bad) equilibrium in BM where agents manipulate preferences
and use safe options. In case 2, students do not strategize, hence reaching a “good”
equilibrium that outperforms DA.
Although TTC and BM (case 2) are similar in terms of ABS, they are very different
in other respects. While TTC ensures that students with priority at good schools do not
worsen their positions, BM (case 2) involves a risk of ending in the worst school. At the
same time, BM (case 2) gives chances to i3, the student with priority the bad school, of
getting access to a better school. In the discussion at the end of the paper we comment
on the limitations of our ABS measure.
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4 The Model
We present a simple model that sufficiently illustrates our insights.11 We have a unit mass
of students i ∈ [0, 1], each of them to be allocated to one of three schools. Two of the
schools are “good” and one is “bad”, in the sense that all students rank it worse. Good
schools are labelled 1 and 2, respectively, whereas the bad school is labelled w. Schools
have capacities C1, C2 and Cw that add up to one. Students have cardinal preferences over
the schools. We represent them by a measurable vNM valuation for the second-best school
v : [0, 1] → (0, 1). We normalize valuations so that each student’s preferred school has
valuation 1 and the least preferred school (w) has valuation 0. No student is indifferent
between any two schools. Ordinal preferences are more extensively explained below.
There is a measurable catchment area function pi : [0, 1]→ {1, 2, w}. Each student has
a unique catchment area where she has priority over students outside the catchment area.
Other ties are resolved when needed using a fair lottery outcome n : [0, 1] → [0, 1] that
assigns one number to each student. We apply the convention that a lower lottery number
beats a higher lottery number.
There is a mass N1, N2 and Nw of students for the catchment areas of schools 1, 2
and w, respectively. Belonging to the catchment area of a school gives priority there over
students outside its catchment area. Without loss of generality we assume that students in
the catchment area of the good school actually prefer the other good school.12 Regarding
the students at the bad school’s catchment area, Nw1 students prefer school 1, and Nw2 =
Nw −Nw1 students prefer school 2.
For each school s, define ρs = Cs/Ns. We say school s is overprioritized if ρs < 1
(capacity is smaller than the number of individuals with priority in the school), and un-
derprioritized in the opposite case. Notice that we cannot have the three schools being
either all overprioritized or all underprioritized, since we have assumed that total capacity
is equal to total mass of students. For two schools s and s′ we say that s is more prior-
itized than s′ if ρs < ρs′ . This variable comes out to be important when comparing the
performance of the studied mechanisms.
For each assignment mechanism we compare the mass of students who obtain a slot in
a school preferred to that of their catchment areas, as a measure of students’ real choice
(since catchment school is the default option when no choice is available). We call this
measure Access to Better Schools, denoted ABS.
Pareto-domination clearly implies having higher ABS, although intuitively the converse
is not true. While an ordering of mechanisms regarding ABS is calculated, we point
out that it does not necessarily imply existence of a Pareto-domination ranking. Indeed,
11In previous versions of this paper we use a more general model with an arbitrary number of schools.
We also discuss the impact of adding additional priority criteria, and we discuss finite economies as well.
This material is available upon request.
12Those who prefer their catchment area school obtain a sure slot there, so we can safely ignore them
and their occupied slots. In case some school’s capacity is less than the number of prioritized students who
prefer it, the model becomes uninteresting in that this school gives all their slots to prioritized students
only, in all the mechanisms we study.
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mechanisms that may induce higher access to better schools may do so in exchange of
placing prioritized students from good schools’ catchment areas to bad schools. At the same
time, mechanisms that perform poorly in terms of ABS may be protecting these students
from being assigned to the bad school. Finally, we also observe that rank-domination
(Featherstone, 2014) does not imply (or is implied by) ABS domination. A mechanism
may be good in placing students from the worst school’s catchment area in either one of
the good schools, while being bad in placing them to her favorite good school. Another
mechanism could rank-dominate the former and at the same time it could be dominated
by it in terms of ABS.
4.1 Worst and Best Cases under the Boston Mechanism
It is well known that both DA and TTC are strategy-proof: there is a dominant strategy
equilibrium in which all students submit the true ranking of schools according to their
preferences. It is also known that agents have incentives to manipulate their rankings in
BM, depending on their cardinal preferences– see for example Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez
(2003), Miralles (2008) or Abdulkadirog˘lu, Che and Yausda (2011). We illustrate two
extreme cases that may constitute part of a Nash equilibrium (in undominated strategies)
for limit preference structures.
The first extreme, which we call Boston Mechanism (worst case), involves every
student manipulating her preferences in order to minimize the probability of being assigned
the bad school. More precisely, for each underprioritized good school, all the prioritized
students rank it first. And for every overprioritized good school, the number of prioritized
students who rank it first exceeds the school’s capacity. This maximum manipulation arises
as the unique Nash equilibrium outcome when the valuation of the bad school is sufficiently
bad for every student. It is also one, yet not necessarily unique, Nash equilibrium prediction
when both good schools are overprioritized, regardless of how worse the bad school is
(compared to the second school). It is easy to envision that this maximal manipulation
equilibrium leads to a dreadful level of access to better schools, since prioritized students
use their safest options, resigning from achieving a slot in a better school while blocking
others from getting access to good schools.
Lemma 1: There is v˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that if the range of v lies strictly above v˜, every
Nash equilibrium (undominated strategies) of the game induced by BM meets the worst
case of the Boston Mechanism.
Appendix A contains the proofs to all lemmas and propositions.
On the other extreme we have the Boston Mechanism (best case), where agents
submit a ranking according their true preferences. This is a limit Nash equilibrium pre-
diction when the valuation every agent has for the worst school is almost as good as the
valuation for her second-best school. That is, there is almost no punishment for being re-
jected in the first round of the assignment algorithm, thus being sincere is optimal. In this
case it is clear that access to better schools is dramatically increased. Prioritized students
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at good schools make no use of this privilege, aiming to better schools and thereby letting
others get access to their preferred schools.13
Lemma 2: There exists v¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that if the range of v lies strictly below v¯, there
is a Nash equilibrium (undominated strategies) of the game induced by BM that coincides
with the best case of the Boston Mechanism.
The Nash equilibrium (in undominated strategies) outcome of the Boston Mechanism is
neither unique nor predictable without knowing the distribution of cardinal von Neumann
- Morgenstern utilities. Fortunately, we can state that the access to better schools measure
would stay between the lower bound and the upper bound provided by the worst case and
best case scenarios. Interestingly, this is also true if there is a proportion of nonstrategic
students that compulsory rank the schools according to their true preferences.
We calculate ABS under BM (worst case and best case). In the worst-case scenario,
agents aim to minimize the probability of ending assigned at the bad school. A school s
is overdemanded if the mass of students ranking it in first position exceeds its capacity.
School s is underdemanded otherwise. Notice that since ranking the bad school other than
last is part of a dominated strategy, it cannot be the case that both two good schools are
underdemanded. Here is our result. Let ABS=
∑
s∈{1,2}max{0, Cs − Ns} be the lower
bound for the access to better schools that can be attained by any mechanism. Essentially,
every slot at each good school is given to a prioritized student, until either all students of
its catchment area have been already assigned or the school capacity is filled.
Proposition 1 ABSBMworst =ABS.
In the Boston Mechanism (best case), all the students truthfully rank their schools
according to their preferences. As in the previous case, it cannot be that both two good
schools are underdemanded in the first round of the assignment algorithm. Thus, either
N1 + Nw2 > C2 or N2 + Nw1 > C1 (or both). Let ABS = C1 + C2 be the obvious upper
bound for the access to better schools that can be attained by any mechanism. If both
schools have sufficient number of students who have it as its first best, then maximal access
to better schools is attained, since both good schools are filled by students who desire it
most. If one of the schools does not have a sufficient amount of students who prefer it,
No +Nwo < Cu, then the remaining capacity after the first round, Cu −No +Nwo, will be
filled by those who have priority at it that did not get their preferred school. If there is
still capacity after that, then it will be filled by individuals from the bad neighborhood.
Therefore, the only seats that will not be used to improve access to better schools will be
the capacity available in the second round occupied by applicants to the overdemended
school that did not get in and that live in the underdemanded school.
Proposition 2 1) If both schools are filled when all students who have it as their first best
demand it, that is, N1 +Nw2 > C2 and N2 +Nw1 > C1, then ABSBMbest = ABS.
13See Kojima and U¨nver (2014) for a characterization of the Boston Mechanism under truthtelling.
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2) If one school is not filled when all students who have it as their first best demand
it (label this school as u and the other school as o), that is, if No + Nwo < Cu, then
ABSBMbest = ABS −min
{
Nu
(
1− Co
Nu+Nwo
)
, Cu −No −Nwu
}
.
4.2 Access to better schools under Deferred Acceptance
The properties derived from DA in this paper are direct implications of it being stable. In
other words, the results in DA would result from any stable mechanism. Stability in our
framework limits ABS largely, because it leads to individuals in the bad neighborhoods
blocking pareto improving exchanges between individuals in the good schools. Individuals
in the good neighborhoods will apply for their first best and if they do not get in they
will apply and get their neighborhood school, capacity permitting. Therefore no individual
living in a good neighborhood will be placed in the bad school, unless her neighborhood
school is overprioritized. If both schools are overprioritized, then clearly no individual
from the bad neighborhood will have access to a good school. But by stability then, no
individual from a good neighborhood can get better access, since, lacking priority to their
preferred school requires that they get a higher lottery number than any student in the
bad neighborhood. Therefore ABS in that case is 0.
On the other hand, if one school is underprioritized, Ch − Nh > 0, then some trade
may arise. The intuition is as follows. Since Ch > Nh some seats at h are available that
no individual living in h will “claim” back. This implies that some individuals from the
bad and from the other good neighborhood will access those seats and thereby achieve
improved access. Additional access may be provided if the individuals from the other good
school that access school h do not fill their own school, creating some leftover capacity
to be filled by non-prioritized students (this will depend on how overprioritized the other
good school is). This process may lead to ABS being substantial in this case. The following
proposition formally states these results.
Proposition 3 1) If both good schools are (weakly) overprioritized, ABSDA = 0.
2) If one school (h) is underprioritized and the other one is (weakly) more prioritized
than the bad school, ABSDA = Ch −Nh.
3) If one school is underprioritized and the other one is less prioritized than the bad
school, ABSDA = ABS −Nh(1− c2)−N2(1− ch).
where cs ∈ [0, 1], are cut-offs such that no non-prioritized student with lottery number
above the cut-off can obtain access to school s. The Appendix provides the exact analytical
expressions for these cut-offs. Notice that in cases 1 and 2 DA reaches the lower bound
of ABS, that is, ABSDA = ABS. More generally, this “trade blocking” systematically
happens as long as min{ρ1, ρ2} ≤ ρw. Performance under DA improves when schools are
less prioritized. As long as more slots at good schools can be given to students from
the catchment area of the bad school, access to better schools is less blocked. Satisfying
students with best lottery numbers from the bad school catchment area allows students
from the catchment area of good schools to “exchange slots”, as long as they also have
sufficiently good lottery numbers. However, DA never reaches the upper bound ABS.
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4.3 Access under Boston versus Deferred Acceptance
We can now provide a comparison between BM and DA regarding access to better schools.
Proposition 4 Access to better schools under BM and DA:
1) If min{ρ1, ρ2} ≤ ρw, then ABS= ABSDA = ABSBMworst < ABSBMbest.
2) If min{ρ1, ρ2} > ρw, then ABS= ABSBMworst < ABSDA < ABSBMbest.
We first consider the case where at least one good school is more prioritized than the
bad school. This case arises, for instance (though not exclusively), when the bad school
is underprioritized. Deferred Acceptance provides the minimum possible level of access to
better schools, coinciding with the worst case of the Boston Mechanism. Yet the best case
scenario of the Boston Mechanism provides higher access to better schools. In some cases,
it reaches the maximum attainable level of access. In such environments, switching from
BM to DA can only worsen the level of access to better schools.
Secondly, we consider the case where both good schools are less prioritized than the
bad school. This case arises, for instance (though not only), when both good schools are
underprioritized. While the worst case scenario of BM still obtains the minimal level of
access to better schools, DA improves upon that. Yet it does reach the access level of
the BM (best case), which is maximal in case of overdemands. In such environments,
the comparison between DA and BM is ambiguous, crucially depending on the level of
preference manipulation under BM.
4.4 An Alternative: Top Trading Cycles
An alternative would be Top Trading Cycles (TTC), which has been proven to be strategy
proof and efficient. With TTC the lower bound ABS is never reached. The reason is simple.
In our model we have that all i1 individuals prefer school 2, and viceversa. Therefore, at
least 2 min{C1, N1, C2, N2}, agents with sufficiently good lottery numbers and priority at
a good school get access to their preferred school through exchanging their priorities for
the good schools. Contrarily to what happens at DA, students from the worst school’s
catchment area cannot “block” this trade. We provide a full calculation of ABS given
by TTC in the Appendix (Proposition 7). The next result summarizes comprehensible
corollaries that help us characterize how good TTC is regarding ABS.
Proposition 5 1) ABS − ABSTTC ≤ |min{C1, N1} −min{C2, N2}|.
2) This upper bound is not necessarily binding. There are cases in which
|min{C1, N1} −min{C2, N2}| > 0 and ABSTTC = ABS.
3) In all cases we have ABSTTC >ABS= ABSBMworst.
TTC clearly outperforms DA when min{ρ1, ρ2} ≤ ρw, that is, when DA obtains minimal
access to better schools. The following proposition shows that this also true in general.
Proposition 6 TTC dominates DA in terms of ABS, that is, ABSTTC > ABSDA.
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We are not able to provide a clear characterization of the ordering between TTC and
BM with respect to ABS. There are environments in which TTC reaches maximal ABS
whereas BM (best case) does not, and cases in which the opposite happens. We provide
examples illustrating both possibilities.
Example 1: When N1 = N2 < min{C1, C2} and some good school is underdemanded
under BM (best case), we have ABS = ABSTTC > ABSBMbest. 
Example 2: When min{N1, N2} > max{C1, C2} and C1 6= C2, we have: ABS =
ABSBMbest > ABSTTC = 2 min{C1, C2}. 
ABS is an aggregate measure of choice that abstracts from potentially important aspects
when allowing families to choose. For instance, BM (best case) may outperform TTC or
vice versa, but qualitatively there are differences in the identity of the agents who obtain
a better choice outside their catchment area. In TTC, no prioritized student from an
underprioritized good school could ever be assigned to a bad school. Hence, access to
better schools arises primarily because students with priority at good schools exchange
their positions. Note that students from the bad school’s catchment area get no indirect
benefit from this. Conditional on not having traded a good school seat, the prioritized
student’s lottery number is worse than that of the students from the bad school’s catchment
area. This way the latter students may obtain access to better schools as well. In BM (best
case), the first round works as if no priorities existed. Prioritized students at good schools
apply for a different school, directly emptying a slot for other students. Consequently,
chances are that a student from a good school’s catchment area ends assigned at the bad
school. The good side of this is that students from the bad school’s catchment area have
more chances to get access to a good school.
5 Discussion
5.1 Reducing the Number of Prioritized Seats
In cities such as Boston, it is well-known that for almost every school only half of avail-
able seats are prioritized according to the catchment area priority criterion. That is, the
catchment area only has a bite in allocating half of the slots. The other half is assigned
according to the lottery number only. The assignment process in Boston lies between our
base model, where all the slots are prioritized, and a school assignment problem with no
catchment area priorities. Not surprisingly, one would expect that access to better schools
is enhanced by lowering the proportion of prioritized seats.
For each good school we can distinguish three cases. In the first case, the number of
prioritized students ultimately applying for a slot at the school is lower than the number of
prioritized seats. The outcome becomes identical to that of the base model. In the second
case, the number of prioritized students applying for a slot at the school exceeds the number
of prioritized seats, and the minimum lottery number among rejected students is too high
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to compete for non-prioritized seats. In that case, the number of prioritized seats acts as a
cap to the loss with respect to ABS. In the third case, the number of prioritized students
applying for a slot at the school exceeds the number of prioritized seats, and the minimum
lottery number among rejected students is sufficiently low to compete for non-prioritized
seats. In that case, it is as if no catchment area priority existed.14
With respect to our base model, as the number of prioritized seats tend to zero, DA and
TTC tend to be identical, both approaching the assignment of Random Serial Dictatorship.
As for BM, its Nash equilibrium outcome tends to the competitive equilibrium outcome of
a Pseudomarket with equal incomes, which is naturally ex-ante efficient (Miralles, 2008).
5.2 Access to Better Schools and other Measures
A fair objection to the concept of Access to Better Schools is that it ignores the assignment
of those who did not improve upon their catchment area school. If one understands “choice”
as a measure of how students stand with respect to their catchment areas, we should
also take count of those students who actually end worse-off than when assigned to their
catchment area schools. This count, that could be named Access to Worse Schools (AWS),
would serve to calculate a “net” ABS, NABS = ABS − AWS.
Indeed one could imagine the following procedure in a scenario with N1 + N2 < Cw.
First, send all students with priority at a good school to the bad school. Then, fill the
remaining positions according to any prefixed algorithm. This procedure provides maximal
ABS. This mechanism seems somewhat unintuitive and pervasive. Nevertheless, what lies
behind this procedure is that students from the bad school catchment area have priority
at all schools over students from good school catchment areas. For instance, the San
Francisco Unified School District gives highest priority in all schools to families living in
areas with “bad schools” (the lowest 20% percentile of average test scores).15 According
to the No Child Left Behind initiative, access to better schools is particularly important
for these families. ABS accounts for it, yet NABS does not, due to a crowding-out effect.
For each student from a “bad school” area that manages to enter a good overdemanded
school, there is a student from that good school catchment area that is assigned to a worse
school. Or else she opts for an outside option, namely a private school.
Going to out theoretical model, let us compare BM (best case) with TTC under the as-
sumption that min{N1, N2} > C1 = C2. Both mechanisms obtain maximal ABS. Neverthe-
less, TTC is ranked above BM (best case) in terms of NABS, since AWSBMbest > AWSTTC .
More students with priority at a good school are assigned to the bad school under BM than
under TTC. Ranking TTC over BM (best case) implies that placing students with priority
at a good school better has more weight than placing students from the bad school catch-
ment area in a better school. In some sense, condemning students from the bad school
14Dur, Kominers, Pathak and So¨nmez (2014) show that the order in which the non-prioritized seats is
distributed matters greatly in determining the number of neighborhood individuals who are accepted in
their first choice.
15http://www.sfusd.edu/en/assets/sfusd-staff/enroll/files/2012-13/annual report march 5 2012 FINAL.pdf,
page 81.
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catchment area to stay there is rewarded, if NABS is used as an aggregate measure of
choice.
Another alternative aggregate measure of school choice is the mass of students that
obtain Access to their Favorite School (AFS). This approximation to students’ satisfaction
takes into account that ending in the actual top choice should not count equally as ending
in the second-best school. Incidentally, in the context of the base model, AFS domination
is equivalent to rank domination (since the mass of agents who obtain a slot in the least-
preferred school is the same in every mechanism). However, we chose ABS because it
counts students’ chances to escape from their catchment areas towards a preferred school.
The quantitative difference between AFS and ABS is the number of students from the bad
school’s catchment area that are assigned to their second-best schools.16
6 Conclusions
Since Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) the Boston Mechanism has been widely criti-
cized in the school choice literature. Since then many cities around the world have sub-
stituted this mechanism by the Gale Shapley Deferred Acceptance mechanism.17Deferred
Acceptance has been adapted from matching theory as a good alternative, since it is not
manipulable, it protects nonstrategic parents and provides more efficient assignments in
setups with strict priorities. The debate between these two mechanisms was based upon
models that assumed extreme scenarios in the priority structure: either no priorities or
strict priorities, and did not incorporate some important realities about the schools sys-
tem, such as the vertical differentiation among schools. We solve a simple model of school
choice with coarse residential priorities and vertical differentiation separating good from
bad schools. We show that if school choice aims to improve access to better schools than
the neighborhood school, then both mechanisms are likely to perform very poorly. We
illustrate that the priority structure, under the presence of a stratified school system, can
determine the final allocation to a great extent in both of these mechanisms.
The range of possible ABS outcomes of the Boston Mechanism is very wide, covering the
lower and the upper bound of all possible ABS levels. The outcome depends on the degree of
preference manipulation among participating parents. Manipulation harms access to better
schools via the use of safe options, while sincerity is good because it makes improvements
possible directly, but also because it empties a slot in a school (the neighborhood school)
that is better preferred by other students. In districts where some schools are perceived
as very bad, avoiding them becomes a primary objective, manipulation naturally arises.
In school districts where vertical differentiation is rather low, sincere school application
strategies are less punished, and ABS can be large.
We have seen that Deferred Acceptance unambiguously provides less access to better
16Incidentally, Table 1 in the preceding example would also report a measure of AFS. Both AFS and
ABS may coincide numerically in several scenarios.
17See Pathak and So¨nmez (2013) for evidence on the number of cities around the word where the Boston
mechanims has been banned.
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schools than the Boston Mechanism when some good school is relatively more prioritized (in
terms of number of prioritized students divided by school capacity) than the bad school/s.
ABS, in that case, reaches the lower bound of all possible outcomes. ABS improves under
DA when all good schools are less prioritized than the bad school/s. The opportunity for
students from a bad school’s catchment area to occupy slots at good schools makes priority
trading among prioritized students at good schools possible. However, access to better
schools under Deferred Acceptance is always inferior to that of the Boston Mechanism if
parents rank schools according to their true preferences.
We have also discussed a third, natural alternative in this debate, which is Top-Trading
Cycles. TTC is more immune to the priority structure because prioritized students at good
schools are allowed to trade their slots with no interferences from students of a bad school’s
catchment area. Top-Trading Cycles obtains higher access to better schools than Deferred
Acceptance. It therefore constitutes a safe mechanism with respect to both the Boston
Mechanism and Deferred Acceptance, in school choice problems where coarse zone priorities
exist.
More generally this paper puts forth the extreme relevance that neighborhood priorities
can have on the final allocation of students to schools, inhibiting the role that preferences
may have in determining the final allocation. The literature has deemed these priorities
as exogenous, but ultimately they constitute a key feature of the final assignment that the
administration can a do change whenever needed.18 Future work should incorporate the
design of these priorities as a fundamental part of the mechanism design problem.
7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A: ABS under DA in the finite economy example.
As said in the main text, students with priority at different good schools would like to
“exchange” their guaranteed slots, yet then the students from the bad school catchment
area may block this trade. We want to derive the chances of exactly a number x of
exchanges occurring. In order to gain more understanding we illustrate a simple case
where n = 2 and x = 1. We calculate all the cases in which this event happens. It could be
that the two top-ranked students in the tie-breaking lottery are one student of type i1 and
another one of type i2, and the third-ranked student is i3. We could have picked
(
2
1
)
= 2
students from each type, and the order between types i1 and i2 does not matter (there
are 2! = 2 ways to arrange them). There are also (6 − 3)! ways to arrange the remaining
students among themselves. Hence we find 2 · 2 · 2 · 2! · 3! = 96 lottery outcomes satisfying
this condition. But we have not covered all cases. It could also be that two students of
type i1 and another one of type i2 occupy the first three positions in the lottery ranking,
while the fourth position is occupied by an i3 student. In this case There is only one way,
or
(
2
2
)
, to pick two students out of the two existing i1 students. We could still pick
(
2
1
)
= 2
18In cities such as Madrid, Barcelona, Boston, San Francisco and New Orleans, among others, priorities
have changed over the last decade.
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students from each of the other types. The way we arrange the two i1 students and the i2
student does not matter (there are 3! combinations). There are (6 − 4)! ways to arrange
the remaining students. We have found other 1 · 2 · 2 · 3! · 2! = 48 such lottery outcomes.
This number has to be multiplied by 2, to cover the final yet symmetric case in which two
students of type i2 and another one of type i1 occupy the first three positions in the lottery
ranking, while the fourth position is occupied by an i3 student. We obtain a total of 192
favorable cases out of 6! = 720 possible lottery outcomes. The probability of exactly one
exchange with two students per school is P (1, 2) = 4
15
. More generally
P (x, n) =
1
(3n)!
[
(
n
x
)(
n
x
)
n(2x)!(3n− 2x− 1)! +
+2
n∑
i=x+1
(
n
x
)(
n
i
)
n(x+ i)!(3n− x− i− 1)!]
=
(
n
x
)[
n
3n− 2x
(
n
x
)(
3n
2x
) + 2 n∑
i=x+1
n
3n− x− i
(
n
i
)(
3n
x+i
)]
Let X(n) denote the expected percentage of students that obtain a slot in a school
better than their catchment area school under DA, when each school has n slots and n
prioritized students. Then
X(n) =
2
3
1
n
n∑
x=1
xP (x, n)
The 2
3
fraction appears because one third of students (those with priority at the bad
school) have no chance to escape from the bad school. Values for X(n) are reported in Table
1 (main text). It can be shown that X(n)→ 0, in fact quite fast (e.g. X(20) = 0.0177).19
7.2 Appendix B: proofs
Proof Lemma1.
Denote with N˜s the mass of students with priority at a good school s who rank s in
first position. We want to find conditions under which N˜s < min{Cs, Ns} cannot occur
for any s ∈ {1, 2} in a Nash equilibrium. By way of contradiction, we suppose that
N˜s < min{Cs, Ns} for some s ∈ {1, 2}.
We restrict attention to undominated strategies, which involve ranking the worst school
in last position. Therefore, the mass of students applying for either school 1 or 2 in the
first round of the assignment algorithm is 1, while the overall capacity of these schools is
C1 + C2. One of these schools must be overdemanded in the first round: we call it o. The
other good school is denoted as u.
19In a previous version of this paper we show that if we fix a proportion of agents wishing to exchange
good school slots, the probability they all do so shrinks to zero at factorial speed as n grows.
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Suppose u is underdemanded in the first round. Then, among those students applying
for school o in the first round without priority there, the chances of ending assigned at w
are at least Cw = 1 − C1 − C2, since the bad school is filled only with students that used
this strategy. The payoff from this latter strategy for these agents is no more than C1 +C2.
Instead, the payoff from applying for the underdemanded school is higher than v˜.
Setting v˜ ≥ C1 +C2 we force every Nash equilibrium to have both good schools overde-
manded. Otherwise all students without priority at o would best respond by ranking the
underdemanded school u first. Since all students with priority at o would also best respond
by ranking the preferred underdemanded school u first, we would contradict the fact that
u is underdemanded.
Since both good schools are overdemanded, every rejected student at the first round
is eventually assigned at the bad school. Use qs for the Nash equilibrium probability of
being accepted at s ∈ {1, 2} for a student without priority at s that applies there in the
first round of the BM algorithm. WLOG assume qu ≥ qo and notice that it must be the
case that qo ≤ C1 + C2. Let 0 < ε < Cw. We find conditions under which every Nash
equilibrium meets qu ≤ 1− ε. Suppose the contrary, thus applying for this school renders
a payoff of more than (1 − ε)v˜. Applying for the other school renders a payoff bounded
by qo ≤ C1 + C2. Set v˜ ≥ C1+C21−ε . Under this condition all non-prioritized students at o
(a mass Nu + Nw) would best respond by ranking u first. But then, since N˜u = Nu, our
initial assumption implies N˜o < min{Co, No}, yielding o underdemanded, a contradiction.
Finally, we fix ε ∈ (0, Cw) and we use qo ≤ qu ≤ 1 − ε. Let N˜s < min{Cs, Ns} for
some s ∈ {o, u}. For a prioritized student at school s applying for the other good school,
the payoff is not more than 1− ε, whereas applying for school s gives payoff above v˜. Set
v˜ = max{C1+C2
1−ε , 1 − ε}. With this, the best response for all students with priority at s is
to rank s in first position, contradicting N˜s < min{Cs, Ns} as part of a Nash equilibrium.

Proof Lemma2.
We restrict attention to undominated strategies, where all students rank the worst
school in last position. Suppose that the profile of submitted rankings coincides with the
profile of ordinal preferences. We show that the best response for all students is precisely
to rank the schools sincerely, when valuations for second-best schools are sufficiently low
(capped by a properly chosen v¯).
First, consider the case where both good schools (labelled s and s′) are overdemanded
in the first round. For a student i who prefers s and abides by the sincere ranking strategy
the payoff is Cs
Ns′+Nws
. Instead, the payoff from the best alternative, putting s′ first in the
ranking, cannot exceed v(i). Setting v¯ ≤ v¯1 = min{ C1N2+Nw1 , C2N1+Nw2} we make sure that all
such i best respond by ranking schools truthfully.
Consider now the case in which one school, labelled u, is underdemanded in the first
round (the other one, o, must be overdemanded). For a student who prefers u the most,
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truthful ranking is obviously a best response. Consider a student i who prefers o the most.
If she ranks o in first position according to her true preferences, she obtains a payoff higher
than Co
Nu+Nwo
. If she instead ranks u first she obtains a payoff v(i). Setting v¯ ≤ v¯2 = CoNu+Nwo
we make sure that all such i best respond by ranking o in first position. Notice that v¯1 = v¯2,
thus v¯ = min{ C1
N2+Nw1
, C2
N1+Nw2
} suffices to obtain the desired result. 
Proof Proposition 1.
In BM (worst case), if some good school s is underprioritized, all of its prioritized
students optimally rank the school of their catchment area first. If a good school s is
overprioritized, no Nash equilibrium (undominated strategies) exists where the number of
prioritized students that rank s first does not exceed its capacity. Altogether we obtain
ABSBMworst =
∑
s∈{1,2}max{0, Cs −Ns} =ABS. 
Proof Proposition 2.
Clear for overdemanded schools (all good slots are given to students that prefer them
the most). When u is underdemanded (hence o is overdemanded), Cu − No − Nwu slots
of u are still available after the first assignment round. This is the maximum number of
slots that students with priority at u who were rejected from o in the first round, a total
of Nu
(
1− Co
Nu+Nwo
)
, can occupy. All other slots are occupied by agents who had priority
at a less-preferred school. 
Proof Proposition 3.
Following in Abdulkadirog˘lu, Che and Yasuda (2014), the outcome of DA can be char-
acterized via cutoffs c1 and c2. Provided a student i with pi(i) 6= s applies at some point for
school s, she would be definitely accepted if her lottery number meets n(i) ≤ cs. Obviously
the cut-off for the worst school is 1. We easily adapt Abdulkadirog˘lu, Che and Yasuda’s
method of calculus to the existence of a zone priority structure. Let l be the good school
with lowest cut-off, and h the good school with highest cut-off. Then cl and ch meet
cl(Nh +Nwl) = max{0, Cl − (1− ch)Nl}
ch(Nl +Nwh) + (ch − cl)Nwl = max{0, Ch − (1− cl)Nh}
1) Ch− (1− cl)Nh ≤ 0. Then cl and ch are both zero. This case arises when both good
schools are (weakly) overprioritized.
2) Cl − (1 − ch)Nl ≤ 0 and Ch − (1 − cl)Nh > 0. In such a case we have cl = 0 and
ch =
Ch−Nh
Nl+Nw
. This case arises when Ch > Nh (that is, ρh > 1) and, after some algebra,
ρl ≤ ρw. This algebra goes as follows. Cl − (1 − ch)Nl ≤ 0 iff Cl − (1 − Ch−NhNl+Nw )Nl ≤ 0,
or Cl − Nl+Nw+Nh−ChNl+Nw Nl ≤ 0, or Cl −
1−Ch
Nl+Nw
Nl ≤ 0, or Cl − Cl+CwNl+NwNl ≤ 0, or
Cl
Nl
≤ Cl+Cw
Nl+Nw
,
which happens if and only if Cl
Nl
≤ Cw
Nw
.
3): Cl − (1 − ch)Nl > 0 and Ch − (1 − cl)Nh > 0. Solving for the system of equations
gives cl =
Nl(ρl−ρw)
Nh+Nwl
and ch = 1− ρw. We have, of course, that this is met when ρh > 1 and
ρl > ρw. Notice that this implies ρw < 1.
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In this case ABSDA = N1c2 + N2c1 + Nw max{c1, c2} = N1c2 + N2c1 + Nw(1 − ρw) =
N1c2 +N2c1 +Nw − Cw = N1c2 +N2c1 + C1 + C2 −N1 −N2. 
Proof Proposition 4.
We already saw that ABSBMworst =ABS. From the preceding Proposition it is clear
thatABSDA =ABS in its cases 1 and 2 (summarized as min{ρ1, ρ2} ≤ ρw), whileABSDA >ABS
if min{ρ1, ρ2} > ρw. It is also clear that ABSBMbest = ABS > ABSDA if both good schools
are overdemanded under BM (best case). It remains to check that ABSBMbest > ABSDA
also when there is one underdemanded good school under BM (best case). We use the la-
belling from previous propositions: u for the underdemanded good school under BM (best
case), o for the overdemanded good school under BM (best case), l for the good school
with lowest cut-off under DA, and h for the good school with highest cut-off under DA.
If min{ρ1, ρ2} ≤ ρw, we show that ABSBMbest > max{Cu − Nu, Co − No} (≥ ABS).
On the one hand, ABSBMbest ≥ Cu +Co−{Cu −No −Nwu} = Co +No +Nwu > Co−No.
On the other hand, ABSBMbest ≥ Cu + Co −Nu
(
1− Co
Nu+Nwo
)
> Cu −Nu.
If min{ρ1, ρ2} > ρw, we need to show that min{Nu
(
1− Co
Nu+Nwo
)
, Cu −No −Nwu} <
Nl(1− ch) +Nh(1− cl).
Case 1: u = h, o = l. It is enough to show Nu
(
1− Co
Nu+Nwo
)
= Nh
(
1− Cl
Nh+Nwl
)
<
Nh(1− cl), or cl < ClNh+Nwl . This follows immediately since cl =
Cl−Nlρw
Nh+Nwl
.
Case 2: u = l, o = h. It suffices to show Cu−No−Nwu = Cl−Nh−Nwl < Nl(1− ch) =
Nlρw. We use the fact that cl =
Cl−Nlρw
Nh+Nwl
< 1 (since cl ≤ ch = 1 − ρw < 1). This implies
exactly Cl −Nh −Nwl < Nlρw.

Proof Proposition 5.
We use the following notation in order to shorten the exposition: s and s′ denote generic
good schools, Ms = min{Cs, Ns}, and ∆ss′ = NsNwNs′−Nws′ if Ns′ > Nws′ and +∞ otherwise.
The calculations and the presentation of results include five cases.
Proposition 7 1) If Cs = min{Cs, Ns, Cs′ , Ns′}, then ABSTTC = ABS − [Ms′ − Cs].
2) If Ns = min{Cs, Ns, Cs′ , Ns′} and Cs − Ns < min{∆ss′ , (Ms′ − Ns) NwNws′ }, then
ABSTTC = ABS −
[
Ms′ −Ns − (Cs −Ns) Nws′Nw
]
.
3) If Ns = min{Cs, Ns, Cs′ , Ns′} and max{Cs − Ns,∆ss′} ≥ (Ms′ − Ns) NwNws′ , then
ABSTTC = ABS.
4) If Ns = min{Cs, Ns, Cs′ , Ns′}, ∆ss′ < min{Cs−Ns, (Ms′−Ns) NwNws′ } and
Cs−Ns−∆ss′
Nws+Ns
<
Ms′−Ns−∆ss′
Nws′
Nw
Nws′
, then ABSTTC = ABS − [Ms′ −Ns−∆ss′ Nws′Nw − (Cs−Ns−∆ss′)
Nws′
Nws+Ns′
].
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5) If Ns = min{Cs, Ns, Cs′ , Ns′}, ∆ss′ < min{Cs−Ns, (Ms′−Ns) NwNws′ } and
Cs−Ns−∆ss′
Nws+Ns
≥
Ms′−Ns−∆ss′
Nws′
Nw
Nws′
, then ABSTTC = ABS.
Proof. Case 1 is easy. Prioritized students at good schools trade their slots until school
s is filled. The assignment process continues with school s′ only, in order of priority, where
Ms′−Cs slots are assigned to students of school s′ catchment area. The waste with respect
to maximal ABS, ABS − ABSTTC , is the mass of good school slots that are assigned to
students of its catchment area.
For the rest of cases. Prioritized students at good schools trade their slots until every
prioritized student at school s obtains a slot at s′. The marginal prioritized student at
school s′ that traded with a prioritized student at school s has lottery number n0 = Ns/Ns′ .
School s now points to the non-prioritized student with best lottery number, who comes
from the bad school catchment area and has number n˜0 = 0 < n0. With probability
Nws
Nw
she keeps this slot and with probability
Nws′
Nw
she points at s′, hence trading with the
marginal prioritized student at school s′. Then, for every ∆ slots that the assignment
process continues giving at school s, it also assigns
Nws′
Nw
∆ at school s′.
For prioritized students at school s′ the marginal lottery number for any given ∆ evolves
as n∆ =
Ns+
Nws′
Nw
∆
Ns′
. For prioritized students at school w the marginal lottery number
evolves as n˜∆ = ∆/Nw. ∆ss′ is the point at which both marginal lottery numbers coincide,
n∆ss′ = n˜∆ss′ . This coincidence does not happen in cases 2 and 3. In case 2, all slots at
school s are filled before marginal lottery numbers equalize. In case 3, either all slots at
school s′ are given before marginal lottery numbers equalize or all its prioritized students
obtain a slot at s. In case 2, the assignment process continues with school s′ only, in order
of priority. Finally, non-traded Ms′ −Ns− (Cs −Ns) Nws′Nw slots are assigned to students of
school s′ catchment area (and this is ABS − ABSTTC). In case 3, students who remain
to be placed can only be assigned to better schools than the catchment area school, thus
there is no waste in terms of ABS.
In cases 4 and 5, marginal lottery numbers coincide, n∆ss′ = n˜∆ss′ , before either cases
2 or 3 arise. After lottery numbers coincide, school s′ continues pointing at the remaining
student with best lottery number. Yet in this case, with probability
Nws+Ns′
Nw+Ns′
(notice the
difference with respect to Nws
Nw
because prioritized students at s′ do not longer have worse
lottery numbers than other students) s points at a student who directly keeps this slot and
with probability
Nws′
Nw+Ns′
the pointed student points at s′, hence trading with the marginal
prioritized student at school s′. In sum, for every δ slots given, δ Nws′
Nw+Ns′
are given at school
s′ and δNws+Ns′
Nw+Ns′
are given at school s. As cases 2 and 3 do, cases 4 and 5 arise depending on
whether all slots at school s are filled first, or either all slots at school s′ are filled first or all
its prioritized students obtain a slot at s. In case 4, the assignment process continues with
school s′ only, in order of priority, where Ms′−Ns−∆ss′ Nws′Nw −(Cs−Ns−∆ss′)
Nws′
Nws+Ns′
slots
are finally assigned to students of school s′ catchment area (and this is ABS −ABSTTC).
23
In case 5, as in case 3, slots that remain to be placed belong to school s, that is better
than the catchment area school for all unassigned students, thus there is no waste in terms
of ABS. 
Proof Proposition 6.
We omit cases where min{ρ1, ρ2} ≤ ρw, that is, when ABSDA =ABS. Consider the
case where Cs = min{Cs, Ns, Cs′ , Ns′}. Then ABS−ABSDA = Ns(1− cs′)+ Ns′(1− cs) >
Ns′(1− cs) ≥ Ns′−Cs ≥ min{Cs′ , Ns′}−Cs = ABS−ABSTTC . The first inequality arises
from the fact that no cutoff equals 1. The second inequality is a feasibility condition (at
least Ns′ − Cs students with priority at school s′ cannot enter at school s).
We next consider the case where Ns = min{Cs, Ns, Cs′ , Ns′}, and we assume that
ABS − ABSTTC > 0. Otherwise we would be done because DA never reaches this upper
bound. Since all students with priority at school s obtain a slot at s′, ABS−ABSTTC > 0
implies that a positive mass of students with priority at school s′ are assigned at school s′
under TTC (thus they cannot obtain access to the more preferred school s).
Focus then on TTC. Let ns
′
s be the maximum lottery number among the students with
priority at school s′ that are assigned at school s. Let nwss be the maximum lottery number
among the students with priority at school w who prefer s among all schools and are
assigned at school s. Notice that ns
′
s ≥ nwss . The reason is that the latter students can
only gain access to school s by directly being pointed by school s. They cannot be pointed
by school s′ before s fills all slots. Simply because not all students with priority at s′ are
pointed by s′ as part of a trading cycle either (before s fills all positions). On the contrary,
students with priority at s′ can gain access to school s either by directly being pointed by
school s or by being part of a trading cycle.
Moreover, notice that only students of the latter and the former types are assigned to
school s. All students with priority at school s obtain a slot at s′. No student with priority
at school w who prefers s′ among all schools is assigned to s. If they are pointed by school
s, they must be part of a trading cycle (this is implied by the fact that a positive mass of
students with priority at school s′ cannot obtain access to the more preferred school s).
Therefore we have ns
′
s Ns′ + n
ws
s Nws = Cs.
But in DA where min{ρ1, ρ2} > ρw, the cutoff for school s meets cs(Ns′ + Nws) =
Cs−(1−cs′)Ns− max{0, (cs−cs′)Nws′}, implying cs < n
s′
s Ns′+nwss Nws
Ns′+Nws
. Given that ns
′
s ≥ nwss
we obtain ns
′
s > cs. But then ABS −ABSDA = Ns(1− cs′)+ Ns′(1− cs) > Ns′(1− cs) >
Ns′(1− ns′s ) = ABS − ABSTTC . 
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